ARISTOTLE ON SPEUSIPPOS
ON EUDOXUS ON PLEASURE

JAMES WARREN

Aristotle’s account in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the role of pleasure in the good life and the effects of pleasure on both character development and action is complex and difficult. Part of this difficulty is generated by Aristotle’s characteristic dialectical approach to the questions he is interested in asking. He raises possibilities, gathers alternative views, and suggests counter-arguments without always making immediately clear his own precise view. By working on the topic of pleasure in this way, Aristotle makes it clear that he is reacting to and offering his own commentary on an earlier debate on the nature and value of pleasure, with its own series of dialectical moves and counter-moves. In Aristotle’s presentation of the matter in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, three major philosophical rivals are invoked as participants in the debate: Eudoxus, Speusippus, and Plato.

Before the composition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* these three had themselves, in all likelihood, been engaged in a discussion of pleasure whose historical details are now mostly lost, but which probably lies in the background of Plato’s great dialectical work on pleasure, *Philebus*.¹ For some time, scholars have been interested in finding evidence for Eudoxus’ and Speusippus’ views in Plato’s work, identifying one or other as the author of a particular position being canvassed by Socrates and Protarchus.² Sometimes in these

1 Speusippus and Eudoxus are roughly contemporaries (407–339 BC and c.408–c.355 BC respectively), who were also writing at the time when Cyrenaic hedonism was being developed by the younger Aristippus, Plato was still writing, and Aristotle himself was no doubt developing his own philosophy.

2 Two groups, in particular, dominate the scholarship. (1) Most famous, perhaps, is the case of the ‘grumpies’ (*hoi duschereis* at *Phileb.* 44B ff. The grumpies or,
enquiries Aristotle is invoked as a witness to demonstrate a particular Eudoxan or Speusippan view. Unfortunately, this threatens to overlook the particular role being played by these two in Aristotle’s own project, since Aristotle is no more interested in offering a straightforward history of the Greeks on pleasure than is Plato. Rather, Aristotle is actively engaged in promoting his own view, clarifying and defending it against various alternatives. In place of an attempt to offer a more historical account of the discussion, therefore, I offer here a treatment which leaves aside for the most part concerns about the precise, chronological step-by-step debate between these various thinkers, although I have no doubt that there must have been some such historical debate, perhaps now unrecoverable in all its details. I propose instead to see what can be made of Aristotle’s use of Eudoxus and Speusippus in his *Nicomachean Ethics* in service of Aristotle’s own philosophical ends. When considered in detail, it is possible to see Aristotle carefully treading a path between various opposed camps and drawing important conclusions which relate closely to his own preferred view of the role of pleasure in the good human life. In this way, the discussion of Eudoxus and Speusippus plays an important part in the persuasive strategy of Aristotle’s own account. That general contention can be illustrated most clearly by considering in detail the first two Eudoxan arguments from *NE* 10.2 in favour of the choiceworthy nature of pleasure. The first of these Aristotle welcomes with some important qualifications; the second he defends against a dialectical

as Socrates refers to them, ‘the enemies of Philebus’ (44b 6) are anti-hedonists, known for their interest in natural science, who focus on the intense pleasures of restoring lacks or removing pains. Socrates in fact says that they deny that there are such things as pleasures (*Phileb.* 44b 9–10). They conclude that all so-called pleasures are necessarily mixed with pains and that the ideal state would involve neither. Speusippus is sometimes offered as the most likely character lying behind the depiction of the *duscheres*. See M. Schofield, ‘Who Were hos duscheres in Plato *Philebus* 44a ff.?’, *Museum Helveticum*, 28 (1971), 2–20; D. Frede (trans.), *Plato: Philebus* (Indianapolis, 1993), p. 1; J. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato* (Oxford, 2003), 67–76. (2) The other group is the ‘subtle thinkers’ or ‘smarties’ (hoi kompooi) at *Phileb.* 53c–55a. J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford, 1982), 152–7, take these also to be espousing a view introduced in critical reaction to Eudoxus. Indeed, Gosling argues in his commentary on the *Philebus* that a large part of that dialogue can be explained as motivated by a desire to answer Eudoxus’ views or, more loosely perhaps, to answer hedonist views inspired by Eudoxus. See J. C. B. Gosling (trans. and comm.), *Plato: Philebus* (Oxford, 1975), esp. 141–2, 226–8; Cf. Gosling and Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, 157–64.

attack by Speusippus—an argument which is treated in more detail in *NE* 7. 13—with a clever dialectical riposte of his own. The order of exposition I intend to follow, therefore, will be what I take to be the dialectical order of point and counterpoint as presented by Aristotle.⁴

Although I shall concentrate on 10. 2, since I also use material from book 7 my account must face directly a perennial difficulty in interpreting Aristotle’s account of pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely the relationship between the two distinct treatments of the topic in the work: one in book 7 (often called the ‘A’ account) and another in book 10 (the ‘B’ account). If the two accounts are somehow inconsistent or otherwise impossible to amalgamate successfully, to that extent my argument would be threatened. Fortunately, I see no reason to accept such a claim.⁵ There are doubtless points of detail which would need further discussion, but most generally the two accounts of pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics* can best be viewed as follows.⁶ The account in book 7 is a defence of some pleasures against various extreme anti-hedonist considerations, listed first at 7. 11, followed by a diagnosis of the reasons why this anti-hedonism has appealed to some other thinkers. These topics have to be addressed at this point of the work in close connection with the discussion of *akrasia* and vice since these phenomena appear to offer prima facie support for a hard line against pleasure. Book 10, on the other hand, is a return to the positive account of the good life, in which Aristotle is sure pleasure must play a role—a role best understood once we grasp properly its nature as

---

⁴ My discussion, evidently, is in many ways indebted to the discussion of Aristotle, Eudoxus, and Speusippus in Gosling and Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, 255–83. But since I share neither their confidence that Plato’s *Philebus* is best read as a thoroughly anti-Eudoxan work, nor the view that Aristotle’s main opponent in *NE* 7 and 10 is Speusippus, my approach is significantly different. (I do, however, agree that Aristotle’s overall conception of pleasure is helpfully viewed as the product of critical reflection on Plato. See e.g. C. C. W. Taylor, ‘Pleasure: Aristotle’s Response to Plato’, in R. Heinaman (ed.), *Plato and Aristotle’s Ethics* (Aldershot, 2003), 1–20 (with response by S. Broadie, 21–7).)


an activity or supervenient activity and its connection with our own nature.

Each of the two discussions is perfectly well motivated and there is every reason to accept the need for two discrete accounts, but their topic is such that some overlap or even repetition of content is natural and expected. One such overlap is the discussion between Eudoxus and Speusippus: Eudoxus plays an important role in explaining the positive connection between pleasure and our nature in 10.2 and Speusippus’ reaction to Eudoxus offers a prime example of an anti-hedonist argument of the kind treated in 7.11–13.

1. Aristotle on Eudoxus’ argument from universal pursuit of pleasure

Aristotle’s extended treatment of Eudoxus’ discussion of pleasure comes in NE 10.2, where we find a number of arguments attributed to Eudoxus which all point to his attempting to promote some kind of hedonism. There are four distinct arguments, gathered in Lassere’s edition of Eudoxus as testimoniunm D3. Our discussion will centre on the first two Eudoxan arguments, which I shall label A and B.

(A) Eudoxus’ argument from universal pursuit of pleasure (1172b9–15):

Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθων ὄντι εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ᾿ ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ᾿ εἶναι τὸ ἀἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ᾿ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον ὃν ἔκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὕτω ἄγαθων ἐφίεται, ὁπερ καὶ τροφή, τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἄγαθον, καὶ οὗ πάντι ἐφίεται, τάγαθων εἶναι.

Eudoxus thought pleasure the good because of seeing all animals aim at it, both rational and non-rational, and because what is choiceworthy in all cases is what is fitting and what is particularly choiceworthy is most powerful. The fact that they all are attracted to the same object suggests that this is best for all things. For each finds what is good for it, as it also does food, but that at which all things aim is the good.7

7 It is generally agreed that there are linguistic reasons to think that Aristotle is following an original Eudoxan version. The word ἔλλογα, for example, is not used elsewhere by Aristotle nor in any other Attic prose.  
8 Bywater in the Oxford Classical Text brackets ἔκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὕτω ἄγαθων ἐφίεται, ὁπερ καὶ τροφή, but this seems to me to be part of an inference that includes the whole remainder of the cited passage.
Eudoxus begins with a general premiss that all animals are pursuers of what is good for them. This is a general thesis about animal motivation which is then supported with a further observation. Each species pursues its natural good, something that is obvious when we consider as an example the way in which each species pursues its own particular diet. Squirrels look for nuts; lions hunt antelopes. Further, Eudoxus has no qualms about adding what is without doubt an interpretation of this behaviour as a further, apparently empirically grounded, premiss. Specifically, he adds the observation that all animals pursue pleasure (τὸ πάνθ᾿ ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς) with no concerns about whether it is indeed possible to see precisely what psychological effects a given animal is aiming for when we observe its behaviour.* All the same, the overall claim is clear: a unifying characteristic of all creatures, both rational and non-rational, is that they pursue pleasure and this universal pursuit of pleasure is somehow natural.

Together, these points suggest an argument along the following lines. All animals seem to pursue radically different ends. But in fact there is one thing which all animals—rational and non-rational—pursue, namely pleasure. This is as true of squirrels as it is of lions, and it is also true of humans. Further, all animals pursue what is good for them, so pleasure must be good for all animals. Indeed, pleasure must be the good precisely because all animals pursue it. In this way, by insisting on and emphasizing the universality of this behaviour, Eudoxus is hoping to move beyond a mere descriptive claim about what all animals do in fact pursue to a normative claim about what is good for all animals and therefore good for humans too: since all animals pursue what is good for them and all animals pursue pleasure, then pleasure is the good. However, on closer inspection Eudoxus’ starting premisses may appear rather too weak for the strong, ultimately normative, conclusion he wishes to secure. He does not, for example, claim that all animals aim only at pleasure (some form of psychological hedonism). Nor, in Aristotle’s version of the argument, does he offer the explicit claim that although animals may aim at a variety of different things depending on circumstances, pleasure is the only thing at which all animals aim. It is possible that the very last clause in the section just cited, namely ‘that at which all things aim is the good’, is meant to carry a great deal of weight, legitimizing some inference from

'All things pursue X’ to ‘X is the good’. But there is little reason to feel compelled to accept such an inference without significant extra argumentation. As commentators often note, Eudoxus’ inference here is very like the argument used to generate Aristotle’s famous claim at the opening of the first chapter of the work: ‘Hence, they have rightly declared that the good is that at which all things aim’ (διὸ καλὸς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντ᾿ ἐφίεται, 1094’2–3). The difficulties of seeing precisely how this conclusion might be thought to follow from the prior claim that actions, projects, and the like each aim at some particular or specific good are well known, and there is a lingering suspicion among some commentators that Aristotle begins the *Nicomachean Ethics* with a gross fallacy.

Fortunately, for present purposes we can leave aside the interpretation of NE 1. 1 and return to Eudoxus’ argument in 10. 2. There remains the question of the precise form and force of Eudoxus’ argument as presented there by Aristotle. But before we return to the text itself, it is worth noting that this Eudoxan argument has something of a complicated afterlife in later ancient philosophy. It is certainly true, for example, that Eudoxus’ argument for pleasure as the final good shares some important characteristics with the famous Epicurean ‘cradle argument’ (particularly as expressed in Cic. *Fin.* 1. 30 and 2. 30–1; compare also D.L. 10. 137), which revived in the Hellenistic period the notion that it is possible to assert that all animals and all human infants ‘naturally’ or instinctively desire pleasure. It would be surprising if Epicurus’ view were not at least in part inspired by Eudoxus’ argument. The Hellenistic debate on the nature of the primary object of impulse, the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, certainly seems to have affected in turn some later readings of Aristotle. See, for example, Alex. Aphr. *De anima liber alter* (Mantissa) 151. 18–27 Bruns, which reports an interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which has Aristotle himself offer pleasure as the first natural object of desire.


12 εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ λέγοντες ἡδονὴν εἶναι κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, κανόνες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐν Ἡθικοῖς Νικομαχείοις λέγει. τρία γὰρ φησιν εἶναι τὰ ἄρετα, τὸ καλὸν,
There are other versions or reports of Eudoxus’ argument which give further evidence of an ongoing interest in it and also point to a persistent uncertainty over its precise argumentative form. Perhaps readers in antiquity had similar concerns to our own over the validity of the argument as reported by Aristotle. At least, in some surviving later reports the argument shows signs of having been subjected to some level of revision or tidying. For example, by way of comparison and as an attempt to offer further illumination of what might have been Eudoxus’ original argument, we might consider the version of the argument ascribed to Eudoxus in a report by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Top. 226. 16–18 Wallies = D5 Lasserre):

Εὔδοξος ἐδείκνυε τὴν ἡδονήν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα μὲν τὰ ζῷα ταῦταν αἵρεσθαι, μηδὲν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν κοινὴν οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν αἵρεσιν.

Eudoxus demonstrated that pleasure was the greatest good from the fact that all animals choose it and that no other good is chosen so generally.

Alexander is commenting on Arist. Top. 3. 1, 116’14–22, which is part of Aristotle’s discussion of how to defend a claim that some proposed object is more choiceworthy (αἱρετώτερον) or better than another. Among the considerations Aristotle advises the dialectician to advance is the very general idea that, for some proposed more choiceworthy object, ‘generally the majority, or everyone, or everything chooses all these things. This is the case for the good, for example. For everything aims at the good’ (Top. 116’18–20).

Alexander evidently thinks that Eudoxus neatly illustrates this tactic, doubtless encouraged by the very close similarity of the tag at Top. 116’19–20 (πάντα γὰρ τάγαθου ἐφίεται) and the final consideration of the Eudoxan argument at NE 1172’a14–15 (οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, τάγαθον εἶναι).13 Alexander also credits Plato with using τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ ἡδύ. ὀρεκτὸν δέ τι καὶ πρὸς ὑποκειόμενον ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα προϊόντες τὴν ἡλικίαν, τοῦ δὲ ἴδιον εὐθύς, εἰ ὁμοίως μὲν ταῦτα ὀρεκτά τι καὶ οἰκεῖα, πρῶτον δὲ ταύτων τὸ ἡδύ, καὶ πρῶτον ἂν ἦμι οἰκεῖον εἴη τούτο, ἐντὸς δὲ ὄρεξις μὲν πᾶσα ἀγαθοῦ ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν τελειόν, τὸ δὲ φανερότερον οὐλοματόν, φανερότερον δὲ ἡνωθεί τὸ ἡδύ, πρῶτον ἂν ἦμι τοῦτο ὀρεκτὸν κατὰ φύσιν.

13 In his Budé edition, Brunschwig comments ad loc. on πάντα at Top. 116’19: ‘La substitution du neutre πάντα au masculin πάντες a pour effet d’élargir à l’ensemble des êtres, même privés de raison, la portée d’une formule qui ne visait primitivement que l’ensemble des hommes. Cette substitution se rattache probablement à la théorie hédoniste d’Eudoxe.’
this endoxon, perhaps with Phileb. 20 D in mind (In Top. 226. 13–14 Wallies).\footnote{Plato, Phileb. 20 D, is part of the argument that the good must be teleion, that is, it must be an ultimate end of pursuit and desire. Gosling, Plato: Philebus, ad 20 D 7, sees a connection with Eudoxus, but perhaps only a loose one: ‘See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics X 2: this is the sort of consideration adduced by Eudoxus to support his view on pleasure. What Plato adds to “what everything pursues” is the notion of “knowing”’ (emphasis original).}

Perhaps we might notice in particular the final clause of Alexander’s report, which appears to isolate pleasure as the only good with such a wide appeal. While there are other goods which are pursued by perhaps the majority of animals, only pleasure is pursued by them all. Aristotle, in contrast, in his version of the argument in NE 10. 2, makes no explicit comment about whether pleasure alone or pleasure especially is chosen by a wide range of animals, let alone whether it alone is chosen by all animals.\footnote{Cf. Weiss, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Eudoxan Hedonism’.} Instead, he states only that all animals pursue pleasure, adding the important clarification that this is true of both rational and non-rational animals. Why this important difference? We have no reason to suppose that Alexander had access to Eudoxus’ ethical philosophy beyond what he could find in Aristotle, so there is no reason to prefer his later presentation as more authentically Eudoxan than that given in NE 10. 2. But it is not difficult to see why Eudoxus might be thought by Alexander to have argued along the lines he reports, and therefore why Alexander’s account of the argument, although undoubtedly based on Aristotle, is subtly but significantly different. Had Eudoxus offered either of these stronger claims, namely (i) that pleasure is the only good at which animals aim or (ii) that pleasure is the only good at which all animals aim, then he might have been able more easily and more persuasively to go on to conclude that, since all animals desire what is good for themselves, and what all animals desire is pleasure, then we have good reason to conclude that pleasure is good for all animals and indeed that it is the only thing that is good for all animals. In that case, pleasure is the good for each and every animal qua animal. In the absence of the stronger claim of the uniquely universal pursuit of pleasure, Eudoxus would have to reach for something else to move from his descriptive premiss to his desired conclusion.

Another version of the argument, reported in Heliodorus, tries a similar manoeuvre by attempting to make clear the opening general
Aristotle on Speusippus on Eudoxus on Pleasure

premiss about the grounds required for some good to be considered a final good. Heliodorus too may have had the relevant passage from the *Topics* or something similar in mind when he offers this summing-up of Eudoxus’ argument:

πᾶσι δὲ κοινῶς ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντα κοινῶς ἐφίενται καὶ πορίζειν βούλονται ἑαυτοῖς· ὃ δὲ πᾶσῶν ἅπασιν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὗ πάντα ἐφίενται, τούτο εἶναι τὸ ἐσχατὸν ἀγαθόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν Εὔδοξος ἀπεφαίνετο περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. (Heliod. *In EN* 210. 25–8 Heylbut)

What is generally good for all is that at which all things aim and which they wish to provide for themselves. And that which is good simpliciter for all and is [or perhaps ‘i.e.’] that at which everything aims is the final good. These are the arguments which Eudoxus propounded about pleasure.

Somehow, as we have already seen, the argument wants to move from the assertion of a very general tendency of all animals to pursue some good to the assertion that the good which is aimed at by all must be the final good. Heliodorus’ simple assertion of this link is not particularly persuasive, of course, unless further supplemented with some other premisses. There is, it must therefore be admitted, some gap in the argument as presented in *NE* 10. 2. Certainly, this inferential gap seems also to have exercised various commentators on Aristotle, Alexander and Heliodorus in particular, whose respective presentations of Eudoxus’ argument show clear signs of wanting to expand or alter the precise formulation given by Aristotle in order to give a clearer or formally more acceptable argument.

Aristotle himself was the first to recognize the difficulty with Eudoxus’ argument and seems to have set himself the task of, first, trying to offer a charitable version of it and, second, salvaging what it could in fact demonstrate if it does indeed fall short of Eudoxus’ own desired conclusions. First, in Aristotle’s account of the argument there is a further inferential move which we have not yet scrutinized and which is not much emphasized in later treatments. Eudoxus seems to have offered a supplementary argument for the conclusion that pleasure is the good, related to but distinct from the observation of animal behaviour. Unfortunately, this supplementary argument is rather obscure. Here it is once again:

Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθον ὤντ’ εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ᾿ ὁρᾶν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἄλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πάσι δ’ εἶναι τὸ αἵρετον τὸ ἔπισκεφτες, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον.
Eudoxus thought pleasure the good because of seeing all animals aim at it, both rational and non-rational, and because what is choiceworthy in all cases is what is fitting and what is particularly choiceworthy is most powerful.

The italicized clause is the supplementary argument. According to Aristotle’s interpretation, Eudoxus’ argument seems to begin merely with the claim that pleasure is an object of pursuit shared by all animals. The important argumentative work, in that case, must be done by this curious additional thought that ‘what is choiceworthy in all cases is what is fitting and what is particularly choiceworthy is most powerful’. Unfortunately, the precise meaning—and indeed, due to Aristotle’s characteristic concision, the correct translation—of this inference is itself unclear. The general sense, however, seems to be a move from the fact of some object being pursued by all creatures to the assertion of some particular characteristic of that object, namely its being ‘fitting’ (ἐπιεικές). Further, if some object is the focus of particularly intense pursuit, then it is somehow ‘supreme’ or ‘most powerful’ (κράτιστον). The notion of being ‘fitting’ is perhaps most interesting here, since the second clause merely offers the additional thought that this characteristic might admit some kind of degrees and that any object which displays it to a superlative degree must be somehow supreme. But for an object to be ‘fitting’ is potentially significant since, from a certain perspective, this would perhaps allow Eudoxus to move from his observational point to a normative claim. The argument might be as follows: given that all animals, rational and non-rational, pursue pleasure, we ought to infer that there is a genuine and important relationship between the nature of all animals and pleasure. In particular, given certain assumptions about the nature of animals and their behaviour, we might conclude that pleasure has the status as a good, perhaps the good. Those assumptions might most generally be thought of as ‘teleological’: animals must all be somehow designed, built, or otherwise naturally arranged so as to pursue what is in fact in some way fitting or good for them. Since all animals—we are assured—pursue pleasure, and since it would not be the case that

16 In recent translations into English, the phrase receives different treatments. Irwin: ‘... in everything what is choiceworthy is decent and what is most choiceworthy is supreme’; Crisp: ‘... what is worthy of choice is good and what is most worthy of choice is best’; Rowe: ‘... since he thought that what was desirable in all cases was what was good, and that what was most so exercised the greatest attraction ...’.

17 Although Aristotle often uses this adjective more or less as a synonym for ‘good’, this more archaic sense (see LSJ s.v. I) seems most plausible here.
all animals would pursue something that was not somehow ‘fitting’, then pleasure must be ‘fitting’ for them. And since all animals seem particularly attracted to pleasure, then we might rightly conclude that pleasure must be most fitting and therefore the good.18

In casting Eudoxus’ argument in this way, Aristotle may also be thinking in terms which fit generally with his own conception of the nature of perception. It would not be particularly odd for him to think of the experience of pleasure as involving or indeed being a certain kind of perception.19 Certainly, various claims he makes later in his discussion of pleasure at \(NE\) 10. 4 relate it closely to activities such as perception and thought (1174\textsuperscript{b}20–3). He further notes that a given sense functions best when exercised on the finest (κάλλιστον 1174\textsuperscript{b}15) or best (κράτιστον 1174\textsuperscript{b}19) object. Aristotle notoriously goes on in that chapter to distinguish pleasure from the activity of seeing by saying that pleasure somehow ‘supervenes’ on the activity (1174\textsuperscript{b}23–33), but there is clearly an important link between the relationship of a given sense to its appropriate object and the pleasure supervenient on the activity of perceiving. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that Aristotle is prepared to fill out Eudoxus’ argument in \(NE\) 10. 2 in very similar terms: just as there is a natural relationship between an organ of sense and its best or most appropriate object, so too it is right similarly to see the experience of pleasure as related to an organism desiring or being attracted to the most naturally appropriate objects of choice.20

On the basis, therefore, of certain broadly teleological assumptions concerning the relationship between a given living thing’s nature and the experience of pleasure Eudoxus’ argument might be strengthened sufficiently to encourage the inference from the universal pursuit of pleasure to the conclusion that pleasure is the good. Unfortunately, it is not a straightforward task to determine whether Eudoxus himself would have shared the relevant and required teleological outlook on animal behaviour. Certainly Aristotle and Plato before him might both have had some sympathy with such

---

18 For some similar thoughts see Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 293–4.
20 We might compare the theory in Plato’s \(Philebus\) of ‘pure’ and ‘true’ pleasures and the idea that they are generated by, for example, the perception of pure patches of colour (\(Phileb\). 51 b–53 c).
a line of argument and, as we shall see, Aristotle’s reaction to this Eudoxan argument later in NE 10. 2 also raises the possibility of using some kind of natural teleology to support the conclusion. But there is no clear sign that Eudoxus himself took such a view.

A significant worry might in any case hang over an attempt to offer Eudoxus a valid and persuasive argument. Perhaps we ought not to expect Aristotle’s version of this argument to appear sound or even to be particularly plausible. Aristotle famously points out that this argument carried what conviction it did more because of Eudoxus’ moderate character rather than its argumentative force (1172b15–18). No one, in other words, would take this argument seriously if it were proposed by someone known to be profligate or otherwise somehow corrupted and shamefully pleasure-seeking.

Eudoxus appeared not to be a simple ‘lover of pleasure’ (φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς, 1172b17). Had he been a famous profligate, the natural suspicion would be that it is offered merely as some kind of apology for a corrupt lifestyle and therefore the argument need not be taken into account at all. But Eudoxus is a sober and reasonable person, so we cannot simply dismiss his view. Perhaps we are eventually meant to think not that Eudoxus’ lifestyle was in conflict with his hedonist philosophy, but that his exceptionally moderate character is a shining example of the pleasure that might come from such a virtue. For Aristotle, certainly we can and should take Eudoxus and Eudoxus’ philosophical views seriously, but there is no reason to overlook the fact that the argument has its weaknesses. Above all, there seem to be some evident and important shortcomings in Eudoxus’ attempt to move from an—already disputable—descriptive premiss about animal behaviour to a claim about the universal and supreme value of something which all animals pursue.

Later in the same chapter Aristotle comes to offer his own con-

21 Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 354–5, usefully relates this to the observations about non-rational animals’ behaviour: ‘For most animals resemble Eudoxus in the goodness and moderation of their lives, though he in this sense is exceptional amongst members of his own kind. Animals’ pleasures, however intense, are seldom ill-timed or inordinate, because their nature generally ensures that the conditions under which a hedonic interest is beneficial are just the conditions under which it is aroused.’

22 Weiss, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Eudoxan Hedonism’, 218, suggests that Eudoxus’ case is stronger if the arguments offered in NE 10. 2 are structured in the opposite way to Aristotle’s order of presentation. If the last argument can secure the conclusion that pleasure is a good (as Aristotle agrees), then the first argument, the argument based on universal pursuit, might be used to show that it is not only a good but is also the chief or only good.
sidered reaction to the argument, which begins to make clear what
he took to be its most important insight (1172\textsuperscript{b}35–1173\textsuperscript{a}5):

οἱ δ᾿ ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ᾿ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν. ἃ γὰρ πάσι
dοκεῖ, ταῦτ᾿ ἐβαί ναί φαμεν· ὁ δ᾿ ἀναιρῶν τὴν πίστιν τὴν πάντων οὐ 
πάνω πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἄνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἢν ἀν 
tὶ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ 
καὶ ἐν τοῖς φάυλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον

Those who in disagreement say that what all things aim at is not good
are talking nonsense. For what seems to all we say is the case. Someone
who denies this piece of evidence will say nothing any more plausible. For
if unthinking things aim at them then there would be something in what
is said. But if intelligent creatures do so too, then how could it [sc. the
objection] make its point? Perhaps, then, also in lower creatures there is
some natural good which is greater than what they are in themselves and
which aims at the appropriate good.

Aristotle is reasonably impressed by Eudoxus and tries to rescue
some of his views against the criticisms of an imagined objector.
He agrees that Eudoxus has pointed to something worth trying to
retain. In particular, Eudoxus is right to think that pleasure is a
good or, perhaps better, some pleasures are good. Aristotle does
not, however, agree that Eudoxus’ conclusion should be accepted
without qualification. It is not the case, he thinks, that pleasure is
the good, and we certainly should not draw that conclusion solely
on the basis of its universal pursuit. Nevertheless, Aristotle says, if
we consider the opposite conclusion, namely that what all creatures
seek is not good, then this is evidently absurd and implausible. In
fact, there are strong reasons for thinking that Aristotle’s interest
in Eudoxus is significantly different from, and indeed much more
insightful than, some of the later commentators we have already
canvassed. The commentators were particularly interested in the
proposed universality of the pursuit of pleasure and thought that
somehow the notion that pleasure is the good ought to be inferred
simply from that opening premiss. Perhaps they were influenced
in this regard by certain presumptions in Hellenistic epistemology,
which in various ways often relied upon consensus as a marker or
criterion of truth. But in any case, as we have seen, this is unlikely
to be a very plausible tactic. Aristotle, on the other hand, rightly
sees that Eudoxus’ most interesting claim is not so much the idea
that every animal pursues pleasure as the point that both rational
and non-rational animals pursue pleasure. This fits very nicely with
Aristotle’s own preferred analysis of the role of pleasure and nature in the good life.

There are two general reasons why we might in any case presume that Aristotle would show some support for Eudoxus. Early in the work, in the division of objects of pursuit and avoidance at \textit{NE} 2. 3, Aristotle had committed himself to the claim that all animals pursue pleasure. Part of his defence of that claim is aimed at persuading us that even humans who are also able to pursue the profitable (τὸ συμφέρον) and the fine (τὸ καλόν) do so in combination with the notion that they are pleasant (1104\textit{B}34–1105\textit{A}1). This close relationship between pleasure and pain and the objects of pursuit aimed at even by mature human agents is an important part of Aristotle’s general explanation of developmental psychology and of his analysis of less than ideal psychological tendencies such as \textit{akrasia}.

In short, Aristotle is in strong agreement with Eudoxus that pleasure is an object of pursuit shared by all animals.

Second, Aristotle is certain of the claim that not all pleasures are bad and thinks that any argument which threatens such a negative conclusion can be rejected immediately on grounds of absurdity. We shall presently see him wield this criterion also against Speusippus. Although, as he stated again back in 2. 3, not all pleasures are good and indeed pleasure can be perhaps the most powerful negative influence in character development, it would be a grave mistake to remove pleasure entirely from the good life. Much of the discussion of \textit{NE} 7. 11–14 is intended to answer many of the most usual criticisms of pleasure, and Aristotle may well feel entitled in 10. 2 to assume that this point has been sufficiently supported.

Aristotle is evidently trying to perform some kind of a salvage operation on the Eudoxan argument, and he does so principally by wondering whether it points to a natural and shared tendency among all animals, rational or otherwise. Eudoxus’ insight is to stress how pleasure is sought not only by non-rational animals, but by rational animals too. Given this additional class of pleasure-seekers, it becomes impossible to conclude that pleasure-seeking is a merely brutish activity unsuitable for rarefied creatures such as ourselves. The critics of pleasure who appear at \textit{NE} 7. 11, 1152\textit{B}19–20, have grasped only half of the picture since they offer as grounds for thinking that pleasure is not good the fact that children and

beasts pursue it. Aristotle's reply at 7. 12, 1153’27–35, simply returns to his view that not all pleasures are good and not all are bad; that children and animals pursue some pleasures is insufficient ground for a general denigration of all pleasures. That was enough for his defensive job in book 7. In book 10, however, Eudoxus' important observations allow Aristotle to go further by combining two distinct inferences. The fact that rational creatures pursue pleasure means that it cannot be dismissed as some merely brutish behaviour. And in addition, the fact that non-rational creatures pursue pleasure means that pleasure can be thought to have a role in what is the natural good for each living thing, and to be able to exercise some kind of motivational force which is independent of any need for rational deliberation. (This is presumably a good indication of why we might accept a teleological account of animal behaviour. Non-rational animals do what they do in pursuit of some natural good despite the lack of any rational deliberative powers.) Pleasure, and the pursuit of pleasure, must therefore play an integral role in any explanation of the proper development of a maturing rational animal.

Of course, there are some distinctions to be drawn between the pursuit of pleasure by, for example, a cat, the pursuit of pleasure by an Athenian aristocrat, and the pursuit of pleasure by a young Athenian boy keen to model himself on the behaviour of proper exemplars of moral excellence, but Aristotle is certainly prepared to speculate that the cat's aim for the pleasures of a place by the fire may be an indication of something rather interesting and significant for our own moral character. Perhaps, he wonders, even in the lower, non-rational creatures there is some natural good which aims them at the good appropriate for them (1173’4–5). Presumably he means something like the following: these lower creatures cannot reason about what is their own proper (οἰκεῖον) good; but pleasure may well serve as a mechanism for encouraging or driving them nevertheless to pursue what they ought. They take pleasure in doing what is their natural and proper activity. My cat, for example, cannot deliberate about what is good for it nor can it engage in any sophisticated deliberation about whether it should sit by the fire on a rainy night. Nevertheless, the fact that it takes pleasure in warmth and comfort means it pursues a good which is proper to it qua cat. Indeed, it is possible that the pleasure my cat experiences during a snooze by the fire might in fact serve as a means of encouraging the cat to act in a
way which is naturally good for it to act, namely by staying inside in the warm. In effect, Aristotle is exploring the possibility that we can make sense of Eudoxus’ argument not as an attempt to belittle the behaviour of rational animals by stressing something they have in common with their non-rational fellows, but as an indication that non-rational animals too may have a natural tendency to orient themselves towards what is good and engage in appropriate natural activity. The fact that pleasure attracts both the rational and the non-rational gives us a good reason for thinking that it is a good, if not the good.

Despite the obvious various gaps in the inferential structure of the original Eudoxan argument, Aristotle is evidently taken by Eudoxus’ observation that in both rational and non-rational creatures pleasure is the object of some pursuit. Of course, whether Eudoxus himself would have welcomed Aristotle’s ‘charitable’ interpretation of his argument is far from certain. All the same, even if his first argument does not suffice on its own to convince us that pleasure is the good, Eudoxus evidently had various others to hand, which Aristotle also reports and about which various other concerns might be raised. It is reasonable to conclude that much of that discussion turns on what we might loosely take to be the necessary formal characteristics for any proposed candidate for ‘the good’. Aristotle is, in all likelihood, responding in these passages to a Eudoxan argument which had already been taken up seriously by Plato, again most obviously in the *Philebus*. For the most part, Aristotle seems happy to point his readers back to Plato’s *Philebus*

---

24 Michael of Ephesus is prepared to make a more extravagant teleological claim: ἔστι γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ νοῦς ἢ νοῦ τις αὐγὴ καὶ ἔλλαμψις, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις ἔδειξε, καὶ "φύσεις ζωῶν ἀδίδακτοι" ὡς Ἰπποκράτης εἴρηκε (In NE 534. 15–17 Heylbut).


26 For example, for a discussion of the Eudoxan argument at NE 10. 2, 1172b23–5, that pleasure is the good because it makes more choiceworthy any good to which it is added, see S. Broadie, ‘On the Idea of the *Summum Bonum*’, in C. Gill (ed.), *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity* (Oxford, 2005), 41–58, esp. 48–50. Aristotle himself notes at 1172b28–34 that this argument had already been convincingly rejected by Plato, and presumably has in mind *Phileb.* 20 1–22 8 9, which concludes that no human life is good and worth living if devoid of either pleasure or intelligence. For Aristotle’s reception of this argument and also of the preceding Eudoxan argument that pleasure is never chosen for the sake of any other good (1172b20–3), see NE 1. 7, 1097b16–21, and J. Cooper, ‘Plato and Aristotle on “Finality” and “(Self-)Sufficiency”’, in R. Heinaman (ed.), *Plato and Aristotle’s Ethics* (Aldershot, 2003), 117–48 (with response by A. Kenny, 148–52), esp. 139–43.
for more clarification; he does not seem to have anything very novel to add to the discussion of this point.

2. Speusippus on Eudoxus’ argument from opposites

Aristotle does, however, have more to say about the discussion between Eudoxus and Speusippus, and what he has to say about that discussion is once again motivated principally by Aristotle’s own concern to offer a satisfying account of the relationship between pleasure, human nature, and the good life. The second of Eudoxus’ arguments, described briefly at NE 10. 2, 1172b18–20, is the argument which is said to have provoked a response from Speusippus and, in return, further enlightening consideration by Aristotle.

(B) Eudoxus’ argument from opposites (1172b18–20):

οὐχ ἴττον δ᾿ ἡτ᾿ ὠετ᾿ εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ᾿ αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ἀμαίοις δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετῶν.

He thought that [the fact that pleasure is the good] was no less clear from its opposite. For pain is of itself for all creatures something to be avoided. And similarly its opposite is to be pursued.

Aristotle’s report is concise, but the argument is clear nevertheless. Eudoxus seems to offer the following inference:

(i) The opposite of something to be avoided is to be pursued.
(ii) Pain is to be avoided.
(iii) Pleasure is the opposite of pain.
(iv) Pleasure is to be pursued.

This same argument is also mentioned in NE 7. 13, but when it appears there it is not explicitly attributed to Eudoxus. In 7. 13, however, Aristotle dwells on Speusippus’ response to the argument and gives his own reaction to Speusippus’ attack.

Most of our evidence which attributes views about pleasure to Speusippus comes, again, from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and from later commentators on Aristotle. We do, however, have additional good evidence that he wrote two works which might well have contained the views which Aristotle mentions: a work Aristippus (possibly attacking the hedonist Cyrenaic Aristippus the younger)\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{27}\) The younger Aristippus, ‘the Mother-taught’, was overtly hedonist. It is less
and a work *On Pleasure*. It is certainly clear from Aristotle’s treatment that Speusippus was interested in Eudoxus’ argument from opposites for the choiceworthy nature of pleasure. This is the next stage of the dialectical story, and is best illustrated by looking at *NE* 7. 13:

\[\text{ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἢ δὲ τῷ τῇ ἐμποδιστικῷ. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τῷ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη αὖ τὴν ἡδονήν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Ἑπείοππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαῖνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῇ ἐλάττων καὶ τῷ ὅσῳ ἐναντίον· οὔ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. (NE 7. 13, 1153b1–7 = F80a Tarán = fr. 108 Isnardi Parente)\]

Moreover, it is also agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided. For it is either bad *simpliciter* or else somehow preventative of something. But the opposite of what is to be avoided, *qua* something bad and to be avoided, is good. So necessarily pleasure is something good. Speusippus’ method of refuting this argument fails, i.e. [his observation] that the larger is opposed to the smaller and the equal. For he [Speusippus] would not say that pleasure is essentially something bad.

Recall Eudoxus’ argument, which I labelled ‘B’ above, as found in *NE* 10. 2:

(i) The opposite of something to be avoided is to be pursued.
(ii) Pain is universally to be avoided.
(iii) Pleasure is the opposite of pain.
(iv) Pleasure is universally to be pursued.

Let us call B(i) the ‘opposites premiss’. It remains neutral on the precise identity of what is to be pursued and what is to be avoided, but merely points out a relationship between whichever candidates are offered. Speusippus’ strategy as reported in *NE* 7. 13 is as follows. He accepts the opposites premiss, at least for dialectical purposes, but proceeds to show that on its basis B(iv) does not necessarily follow. Or, perhaps more precisely, he shows that B(iv) no more follows than an alternative conclusion which would not be to the liking of the hedonist Eudoxus. He points out in reaction clear that Aristippus’ grandfather, also called Aristippus, was a hedonist at all, let alone an explicit advocate of hedonism. See D.L. 4. 4–5 with L. Tarán, *Speusippus of Athens* (Leiden, 1981), 188–92, and Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 35 and 65 n. 79. See also V. Tsouna McKirahan, ‘The Socratic Origin of the Cynics and Cyrenaics’, in P. A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca, NY, 1994), 367–91, esp. 377–82.
to B(ii) that pain is opposed not only to pleasure. Rather, pain is opposed both to pleasure and to the intermediate just as—to use Speusippus’ own example—‘larger’ is opposed both to ‘smaller’ and to ‘equal’. B(iii), in other words, might be true but it is by no means the only premiss that can be used in conjunction with B(i).

Having pointed out the wider possibilities of opposition to be found between any two members of such a trio, Speusippus can also note that various other arguments are possible which again rely on the ‘opposites premiss’. Speusippus can therefore not merely say that Eudoxus’ own argument fails to secure without question Eudoxus’ preferred conclusion; he can also go on to borrow Eudoxan reasoning to generate arguments in favour of other conclusions. For example, since it seems that Speusippus wants to claim that any one member of the trio ‘pleasure–intermediate–pain’ is opposed to either of the other two, Speusippus could say that pleasure and pain are both opposed to the intermediate. At best, therefore, if the opposites premiss B(i) is true, it shows only that pleasure is no more to be pursued than the intermediate. In that case, Speusippus could borrow Eudoxus’ opposites premiss B(i) and use it to show that the intermediate is to be pursued since its opposite is to be avoided. In effect, we would in that case produce a new argument, isomorphic with Eudoxus’ own. It can be set out as follows:

*Speusippus’ reformulated Eudoxan argument (B[2])*

(i) The opposite of something to be avoided is to be pursued.
(ii) Pain is to be avoided.
(iii) The intermediate is the opposite of pain.
(iv) The intermediate is to be pursued.

B[2](i) and B[2](ii) are borrowed from Eudoxus. B[2](iii) is Speusippus’ own alternative premiss, based on his observation that Eudoxus ignores the part of the intermediate in the trio ‘pain–intermediate–pleasure’. For Speusippus, any one of these three might rightly be said to be opposed to any other. This generates three possible pairs of opposites: pleasure and pain (the pair highlighted by Eudoxus), pain and the intermediate (the pair used here by Speusippus), and pleasure and the intermediate (which, as we

28 This approach, viewing Speusippus’ engagement with the argument from opposites as primarily dialectical, might avoid some of the interpretative problems highlighted by Gosling and Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, 228–31.
shall see, is the remaining possibility exploited by Aristotle in reply to Speusippus). In Speusippus’ argument here, the conclusion B[2](iv) is not only to be seen as an alternative and competitor for Eudoxus’ own conclusion, B(iv). Notably, it also appears to be consistent with something we learn from other reports about Speusippus’ ethical views. It is very likely, in fact, that Speusippus was prepared to advocate that we should be aiming for some sort of neutral state, neither experiencing pain nor any particular process of pleasure. Note, however, that it is not yet clear whether he was committed to that conclusion on the basis of his own endorsement of an argument along the lines of B[2]. Aristotle himself, we should note, is appropriately reluctant to attribute to Speusippus any determinate conclusion of his own. In Aristotle’s presentation, Speusippus’ interest in Eudoxus is entirely dialectical.

3. Speusippus and painlessness

In emphasizing the dialectical nature of Speusippus’ role in Aristotle’s account I do not mean to deny that there are reasons to think that Speusippus did have some positive views of his own relevant to the issue at hand. However, I see no strong reason to think these are uppermost in Aristotle’s mind when he invokes Speusippus, and they are therefore not crucial to the interpretation of this section of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Nevertheless, some relatively brief discussion of Speusippus’ view is probably in order.

Speusippus does seem to be committed to B[2](iv), the claim that the intermediate state is to be pursued. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence for us to be confident that Speusippus’ own conception of the telos identified the goal of life as a state which is free from trouble or disturbance. The clearest report is found in Clement of Alexandria:

Σπεύσιππος τε ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδοῦς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησίν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ εἶναι ἀγαθὰν, ὡς δὴ καταστάσεως ἀπαντῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὀρέξεω ἐχειν, στοχάζειν δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀθλησίας. εἶεν δ᾿ ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικαί. (Clem. *Strom.* 2. 133. 4=F77 Tarán =fr. 101 Isnardi Parente)\(^{29}\)

Speusippus, Plato’s nephew, says that well-being is a state complete in things according to nature or the possession of goods. He says that all

\(^{29}\) See also Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 64–6.
humans have a desire for this state, but that good people aim for being free from trouble. The virtues, then, would be means of creating well-being.

The first point to draw from this brief comment is that it gives us what is surely Speusippus' own conception of the goal of life. For him, aochlēsia would seem to be the telos, and the term aochlēsia would most naturally be taken to imply a state of ‘absence of trouble’, presumably referring to a kind of intermediate state. The closest relatives of this view, and the views which Clement mentions in the surrounding text, are Hieronymus' telos of to aochlētōs zên, the Epicurean telos of pleasure and the absence of pain (at Strom. 2. 127), and the Epicurean view’s various Democritean ancestors, such as Democritus’ athambia and Nausiphanes’ akataplēxia (at Strom. 2. 130).30 But we should also note the second part of this report. Here, apparently, we have evidence for some degree of interest in moral psychology. Speusippus seems to have claimed that all people have a desire for well-being (eudaimonia), but that only the good aim at the preferred state of being trouble-free.

It is likely that the first part of this claim, the universal desire for eudaimonia, is a simple repetition of a commonplace of Platonic, Aristotelian, and later Greek ethics.31 No one, after all, would desire to be unhappy. This general concession nevertheless leaves wide open what various people take happiness to consist in. At the very least, Speusippus is certainly committed to the claims that everyone desires eudaimonia and that eudaimonia is aochlēsia. But from these two it does not necessarily follow that everyone desires aochlēsia. Indeed, Speusippus does say that only good people aim at aochlēsia, which might be taken to imply that all other people do not; they merely aim at eudaimonia, whatever they take that to be. On the other hand, it is worth considering briefly whether a different position might be attributed to Speusippus on the basis of this passage. If, for example, Speusippus is claiming something stronger than the very general idea that all people desire to be happy, saying instead that all people share a desire for a particular state or the possession of certain goods, then his position relative to Eudoxus becomes more interesting. Let us imagine, for the moment, that Speusippus intends to claim that only good people consciously or deliberately aim to be trouble-free, whereas the rest of us retain

31 See Tarán, Speusippus of Athen., 436–7.
some desire for this same state of being trouble-free and possessing
the natural goods without, however, making it the single conscious
and recognized aim of our various actions and desires. The dif-
ference between the two classes of person, if this line of thought is
correct, would not be a radical difference between what is ultimately
being desired but rather a difference in the sense in which it is a
recognized and explicit goal of someone’s actions. For most of us,
we desire this state of trouble-free living without thinking about it
in any clear, useful, and considered way; good people, on the other
hand, make it the express target of all their actions and desires. As
this interpretation of Speusippus’ view stands, it is rather like some
interpretations of, for example, Epicurean hedonism, which hold
that for the Epicureans too there is a universal desire for pleasure
but only a few enlightened people consciously recognize the identity
of happiness and trouble-free living and arrange their desires and
goals effectively.13 There is no strong reason to discount this psy-
chological claim as an authentic part of Speusippus’ view. Indeed,
given that we have already seen the emphasis placed by Eudoxus on
the fact that, on his view, all people and all animals pursue pleasure,
this might give further grounds to suspect that Speusippus would
have countered Eudoxus’ psychological hedonism with his own al-
ternative claim. Instead of seeing a universal pursuit of pleasure,
Speusippus insists on there being merely a universal desire to be
happy, for eudaimonia, and specifically for a trouble-free life.

The evidence from Clement for Speusippus’ support of a telos
of aochlēsia also directs us to one of the longest-running disputes
about Speusippus’ ethical views. Is Speusippus the promoter of
the theory discussed in Plato’s Philebus 43 c–44 d, that pleasure is
merely the cessation of pain, the thesis which Socrates takes to be
equivalent to denying that there are any pleasures at all?14 If so,
perhaps the Philebus can offer even more information to fill in our
picture of Speusippus’ views and might provide further important
background to his role in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Unfor-
fortunately, there are obvious obstacles to an approach which tries
to draw a straightforward connection between Speusippus and the

13 For the ‘psychological hedonist’ interpretation of Epicurus see, in particular,
R. Woolf, ‘What Kind of Hedonist is Epicurus?’, Phronesis, 49 (2004), 303–22, and
Ethics (Cambridge, 1998), 121–50. For an alternative view see J. Cooper, ‘Pleasure
14 For further discussion and references to relevant literature see n. 2 above.
The grumpies (*duschereis*) in the *Philebus* are introduced as believing that there are, in fact, not really any such things as pleasures (44 B 9–10), and we have no reason to think that Speusippus himself ever made such a claim. Of course, there are ways round this kind of problem. Perhaps we might say that the argument at *Phil*. 44 n that there are not really any pleasures is best understood as a polemical argument not only delivered by Socrates as part of his extended discussion with Protarchus but also perhaps with a Speusippan target in Plato’s mind. If it is agreed that (i) there is no so-called pleasure which is not mixed with pain or otherwise tainted, that so-called pleasures are merely releases from pain (44 c 1–2) and (ii) that no impure or tainted pleasure is ‘really’ a pleasure, then the conclusion follows easily that (iii) there are in fact no real pleasures. It is not unthinkable that Plato had grounds for attributing something like (i) and (ii) to Speusippus or, less directly, thought that he could find reasons to persuade anyone to agree that these are in fact what Speusippus believes. In that case, the conclusion that there are in fact no pleasures need not be Speusippus’ own explicit view. It is instead provided as a conclusion to which he ought to be committed given his other known views. The fact that it is an implausible or, perhaps, regrettable view merely serves to put readers on their guard against the presuppositions that might lead in that direction.

The most reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the consideration of this section of the *Philebus* are as follows. Some of the grumpies’ views are likely to have been inspired by Speusippus’ promotion of an intermediate state as an object of pursuit, and might well have been fuelled by Speusippus’ known objections to hedonists such as Eudoxus and perhaps also Aristippus. He is certainly the sort of thinker who could easily be lined up as an ‘enemy’ of Protarchus in the sense that Protarchus still wants to find a place for pleasure in the good life. But on the other hand, we should be careful about attributing wholesale to the historical Speusippus everything Socrates makes these grumpies say. In short, the *Philebus* is of very little use for anyone interested in reconstructing in any detail the philosophical views of the historical Speusippus, even if we do indeed accept him as the inspiration for this passage. There is every reason to think that the portrayal of the *duschereis* is in part polemical: Socrates seems intent on drawing from their position an extreme claim about the non-existence of any pleasures
which is most unlikely to be something endorsed in propria persona by Speusippus. Further, in the economy of the dialogue, Socrates has absolutely no reason to be concerned with being accurate in his portrayal of other thinkers. His interest lies in taking up an insight that these grumpies have into the particular nature of a certain kind of false pleasure. And Plato, similarly, is not constrained by any need for historical accuracy. Instead, he can enjoy the licence to exaggerate or to draw conclusions from some considerations Speusippus might have shared to paint a picture of a theory which does not necessarily conform exactly to what Speusippus himself would have thought, with perhaps a playful nod to his nephew in the process.

In particular, it is quite possible that the denial that there are in fact any pleasures is an exaggeration by Plato of an authentically Speusippan view that all pleasures are at best mixed. Further, some have even argued that Speusippus’ *aochlesia* could (like Epicurus’ *ataraxia*) have been conceived as a pleasant state, and that his intention was merely to object to the pursuit of episodes of pleasure, perhaps conceived as restorations of deficiencies, as endorsed by Eudoxus’ hedonism. Perhaps Speusippus was himself muddled or else otherwise stymied by attempting to say that this state is pleasant while objecting to the pursuit of pleasurable experiences. As later criticisms of the Epicureans well demonstrate, it is not hard to see how this might be a difficult position to maintain.34

The upshot of this somewhat lengthy detour is simple, but worth further emphasis. We have no reason to think that Speusippus’ argument against Eudoxus reported in *NE* 7. 13 is anything other than dialectical. There is no reason to think either that Speusippus himself endorsed the ‘opposites premiss’ which Eudoxus used or that he endorsed the conclusion that the intermediate state is to be pursued on the basis of the argument Aristotle reports. The most we can say with much certainty, therefore, is that Speusippus identified the goal of life with an untroubled state. It is also likely that he distinguished this state from the experience of pleasure and that it was therefore intended as some kind of intermediate state between pleasure and pain. We have no good reason, however, to suppose that Speusippus’ reasons for thinking that this is the *telos* are captured by his reformulated version of Eudoxus’ argument (B[2]), namely the ‘opposites premiss’ combined with the notion

34 For this proposal see Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 66, 69, 76–7.
that pain is both bad and also opposed to the intermediate state. Our best interpretation of the argument mentioned in *NE* 7.13 is that it was a purely dialectical manoeuvre designed to undermine Eudoxus’ competing hedonist account by showing that one of the purported justifications for that hedonism was no more a support for Eudoxus’ than for Speusippus’ own conclusion. Moreover, in his reaction to Speusippus’ argument, Aristotle too makes it clear that this can be no more than a dialectical manoeuvre, and an unsuccessful one at that.

4. Aristotle on Speusippus on Eudoxus

The subtle dialectical interplay between our philosophers does not end at this point, since Aristotle takes up Eudoxus’ cause and offers his own response to Speusippus. For his part, Aristotle is evidently not particularly enamoured with Speusippus’ refutation of Eudoxus’ argument. Aristotle’s reaction to Speusippus comes in two parts. The second is found at the end of *NE* 10.2 and will bring us full circle back to Eudoxus’ first argument. The first part of Aristotle’s response is, however, extremely concise, and some informed reconstruction will be necessary in order to give a full account of what Aristotle might have in mind. Nevertheless, a good case can be made for seeing Aristotle offer a further twist on the argument from opposites, this time aimed back at Speusippus and relying on the third possible pair of opposites made available by Speusippus’ own insistence on the recognition of the intermediate state, namely: pleasure and the intermediate. The starting-point for this further stage in the argument is very brief: at the end of his treatment of the Speusippan argument in 7.13 Aristotle merely says, somewhat rhetorically, that ‘he [Speusippus] would not say that pleasure is essentially something bad’ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, *NE* 1153b6–7).

Did Speusippus ever say that pleasure is bad? We have no sound evidence to make us think that he did, even though such a view might mistakenly be thought by his critics to be implicit in the very notion that the *telos* is an intermediate, pain-free, state. In fact, the only direct evidence for the suggestion that he might have stated this extreme position is this very comment from Aristotle and a later report in Aulus Gellius:
Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret. (Gell. 9. 5. 4 = F84 Taran)

Speusippus and the whole of the old Academy say that pleasure and pain are two mutually opposing evils, but that the good is what stands in the middle of the two.

This comment is likely to be derived ultimately from Aristotle’s own treatment of Speusippus’ argument and therefore it cannot be given any independent evidential weight. Indeed, Aristotle’s comment that ‘Speusippus would not say that pleasure is essentially something bad’ rather implies that Speusippus did not explicitly endorse such a view. The most plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s comment, therefore, is as follows. Aristotle may well have thought that this absurd conclusion that pleasure is bad could plausibly be foisted upon Speusippus as a way of undermining Speusippus’ own attack on Eudoxus. The thesis that all pleasure is bad was not, on this interpretation, ever espoused by Speusippus and Aristotle never thought that it had been. But Aristotle noticed that it would be the conclusion of yet another version of the opposites argument for which, as we have seen, Speusippus had publicly taken Eudoxus to task. And this third version of the opposites argument would equally follow from Speusippus’ own observation, again originally wielded against Eudoxus, that any member of the trio pleasure—the intermediate—pain can be thought of as the opposite of any other member of the trio. My suspicion, therefore, is that in this final comment about what ‘no one would say’ Aristotle is referring to a difficulty which Speusippus’ own clever dialectical strategy will face. In addition to Eudoxus’ original opposites argument for the thesis that pleasure is to be pursued (B) and Speusippus’ reformulation of that argument for the thesis that the intermediate state is to be pursued (B[2]), there is a third formulation of the argument which would generate the conclusion that pleasure is to be avoided. Call this third version B[3]:

Aristotle’s reformulated Eudoxan argument (B[3])

(i) The opposite of something to be avoided is to be pursued.
(ii) The intermediate is to be pursued.
(iii) The intermediate is the opposite of pleasure.
(iv) Pleasure is to be avoided.

B[3](i) is another restatement of Eudoxus’ original ‘opposites pre-
miss’. B[3](ii) is the conclusion of Speusippus’ argument B[2] and
we have seen other good evidence that Speusippus endorsed it,
probably on independent grounds. B[3](iii) is a premiss which is
again based on Speusippus’ complaint that Eudoxus has failed to
see the various oppositions possible in the relevant trio of pleasure–
the intermediate–pain. B[3](iv) is the opposite of the conclusion
of Eudoxus’ original argument (B(iv)) and is, in Aristotle’s eyes,
something that no one would want to say.16

At this point we need to take stock of what appears to be a
rather complicated dialectical situation. Speusippus’ problem now,
of course, is that his own observation of the set of possible oppo-
sitions in the trio pleasure–the intermediate–pain means that he
himself can offer no reason to think that argument B[2] is any more
to be endorsed than argument B[3]. His own argument against Eu-
doxus has no more force than this third ‘Aristotelian’ argument.
Aristotle’s point is presumably that since B[3](iv) is patently ab-
surd, then any argumentative strategy which threatens to produce
an argument in its favour cannot be sound. And if this third ar-
gument for the absurd conclusion is no more and no less to be
accepted than Speusippus’ dialectical argument against Eudoxus,
then the absurdity of B[3](iv) can be used to reject Speusippus’
anti-Eudoxan argument and let the original Eudoxan argument B
off the hook. Once again, there is no reason to believe that
Speusippus endorsed this form of argument, but all the same
Aristotle thinks that the Speusippian criticism can be dissolved
by pointing out its own clearly unpalatable possible consequences.
Furthermore, on this interpretation Speusippus is beaten at the
hands of his own objection to Eudoxus, a very pleasing dialecti-
cal result for Aristotle and a very embarrassing one for Speu-
sippus.

16 Compare Aspas. In NE 150. 3–8 and 19–26 Heylbut = F86b Tārān, which ap-
pears simply to restate Eudoxus’ original argument and present it as Aristotle’s reac-
tion to Speusippus. Aspasius is surely mistaken here (as noted by Tārān, Speusippus of Athen, 442–3).
It is not clear—indeed, it is very unlikely—that Speusippus himself ever endorsed or would have endorsed the conclusion that all pleasure is bad and to be avoided (B\(3\)(iv)). In fact, we have seen no strong reason to think that he himself endorsed the Eudoxan opposites premiss (B(i)). Indeed, he could merely have been arguing dialectically with Eudoxus all along and pointing out a flaw in Eudoxus’ reasoning without himself wanting to draw any conclusions about the value or otherwise of pleasure based on its purported opposition to pain or to the intermediate. In other words, while we can be sure he endorsed B\(2\)(iv), we cannot be sure he did so on the basis of the argument B\(2\) and, in particular, because of any commitment to the opposites premiss.\(^{37}\)

Even so, it is very likely that Aristotle’s indignant rejection of the thought that all pleasure is to be avoided is more than a simple reliance on general common sense. Aristotle clearly thinks that he can dismiss Speusippus and rescue something of Eudoxus’ conclusion and that he can reuse the conclusion of Eudoxus’ first argument to bolster his second. This is the second part of Aristotle’s reaction to Speusippus. The conclusion of that first argument, the ‘argument from universal pursuit’ (A), even the weaker conclusion that Aristotle wishes to draw, can be neatly used to defend Eudoxus against Speusippus’ attack on the second argument, the ‘argument from opposites’ (B). Even if Eudoxus’ observation of the behaviour of rational and non-rational animals is not up to the task of securing the notion that pleasure is the only good, it will suffice to rule out any competing view so extreme as to claim that all pleasures are bad. Creatures would surely not be so constituted, we might imagine Aristotle exclaiming, that they all pursue something which is bad. As we saw, Aristotle thought there was some truth in Eudoxus’ argument A: pleasure is in some sense a universal goal of pursuit, and we wondered whether Aristotle might perhaps further support this conclusion on the basis of his teleological view of animals’ nature. However he thought the relative choiceworthiness of pleasure might be explained, Aristotle certainly thinks that there ought to be a positive evaluation of at least some pleasures. So there must be something wrong with any view that says all pleasure should be avoided.

Aristotle himself remarks at 10. 2, 1172\(^b\)35–1173\(^a\)2:

οἱ δ᾿ ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ᾿ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτα ἐναὶ φαμεν· ὁ δ᾿ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.

Those who in disagreement say that what all things aim at is not good are probably talking nonsense. For what seems to be the case to all, we say is the case. Someone who denies this piece of evidence will say nothing any more plausible.

It is not difficult to see Speusippus again implicated in the opposed camp, and Aristotle here quite clearly points to the universal pursuit of pleasure as sound evidence against the Speusippan view he had discounted briefly at 7. 13. We should not, I think, on this basis saddle Aristotle with the extreme view that generally speaking anything which is universally agreed must be accepted as true, but rather, in this specific case, he is sure that, given clear and persuasive claims about animal psychology, Speusippus’ claim is so implausible that it can be rejected.38

In this way, reflecting on Eudoxus’ first argument, A, would give further support for the rejection of Speusippus’ over-critical approach to Eudoxus’ second argument, B. The dialectic is relatively complicated, but a plausible reconstruction of the position we have now arrived at would be something like the following. If Aristotle can secure the conclusion that Speusippus’ criticism of Eudoxus in B[2] is no more plausible than Aristotle’s own version B[3], and that the conclusion of B[3] is in no way acceptable, then he can undermine the critical force of B[2]. Further, Aristotle’s grounds for rejecting the conclusion of B[3] come at least in part from his acceptance of a weakened form of Eudoxus’ conclusion to A. In other words, having reflected on the pursuit of pleasure by both rational and irrational creatures, Aristotle is confident that we will all see that the conclusion that all pleasure is to be avoided is absurd. We will also agree that the arguments of anyone who either explicitly endorses or otherwise might be thought to imply this conclusion can be rejected and their criticisms of the pro-pleasure case can be set aside. Now, if Speusippus, or anyone similarly minded to take a more critical view of the positive value

---

of pleasure, is to respond to Aristotle’s critical remarks, he can no longer merely rely on the dialectical argument B[2]. Instead, if he wishes to rescue his criticism of the argument from opposites, he will have to offer some kind of response to the common view that at least some pleasures are good and to the observed fact that both rational and non-rational creatures pursue pleasure. He will therefore be best served by tackling directly Eudoxus’ first argument (A) or, perhaps more important still, Aristotle’s charitable interpretation of it.

The next section, at 10. 2, 1173\(b\) 5–13, brings the matter and the chapter to a conclusion and presents yet another pleasing twist. It turns out to be rather difficult for Speusippus to attack argument A:

οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακῶν κακῶ ἀμφότεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὄντων (τῶν) κακῶν καὶ φεύγαντες ἄμφωτεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἄμφωτεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἄμφωτεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἄμφωτεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἄμφωτεροι—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.

Nor does the argument concerning the opposite seem correct. For they say it is not the case that if pain is bad then pleasure is good. For bad is opposed to bad and both [good and bad] to what is neither. Their argument is not bad, but on the other hand they are not saying anything true about what was said. For if these two were both bad then they ought both to be avoided, and if neither were bad then neither ought to be avoided or both equally. But as it is, they evidently avoid one [sc. pain] as a bad and choose the other [sc. pleasure] as good. And that is how the two are opposed.

The clever argument about opposites is clearly Speusippus’ reminder from 7. 13 that it is possible to view either pleasure or pain as opposed not merely to one another but also to some intermediate. So it will not follow simply from the badness of pain that pleasure is good. This much is familiar. The new twist is for Aristotle to point to observed behaviour to show that in fact Eudoxus’ original opposites argument, B, is supported by his independently plausible account of how animals and people in fact behave as outlined in argument A. It is simply not true that both pleasure and pain are avoided, nor that neither is avoided. Furthermore, Aristotle here offers a kind of self-refutation argument against those who questioned argument B’s conclusion. If we insist that the subject of φαίνονται φεύγοντες is the same as the preceding λέγοντες
and ἀληθεύοντες, then his point is not just the general one that people tend to pursue pleasure, but the much more dialectically effective comment that the very people who offer this clever riposte to Eudoxus evidently—like the rest of us—themselves avoid pain and pursue pleasure.39 And rightly so; this is, as Eudoxus indicated in his argument A, a universal fact for both rational and non-rational animals. Eudoxus’ behaviour showed that he was not a mere apologist for profligacy; the behaviour of these very objectors to Eudoxus—the most prominent of whom is Speusippus, presumably—demonstrates that Eudoxus was correct to insist from the outset that pleasure is pursued as a good and pain avoided as a bad. In other words, Speusippus’ own behaviour offers additional support for Eudoxus’ views. So it is not merely the case, as NE 7. 13 puts it, that no one would say that pleasure is bad. In addition, no one in fact acts generally to avoid pleasure as something bad—not even the people offering the very argument that it is so.

Interpreted in this way, the final section shows quite clearly what Aristotle wants to take both from Eudoxus’ arguments and also from Speusippus’ attempted response. It shows, therefore, what Aristotle’s overall interest is in dealing with these two philosophers: they allow him to illustrate what he himself takes to be the truth of the matter. From Eudoxus, Aristotle can draw support for his general view that we are right to think that pleasure is importantly linked to our nature as living organisms. While we would be wrong to conclude with Eudoxus that pleasure is the good, we would also be wrong to discount the strong evidence he offers for the choiceworthy nature of at least some pleasures. Speusippus, on the other hand, offers an opportunity for Aristotle to return to various anti-hedonist arguments and, most importantly, show that Speusippus’ clever dialectical moves no more prove that Eudoxus is wrong than some other, patently absurd, conclusion and are in any event evidently not capable of being put into consistent practice.

39 This point is often obscured in translations which take the subject of φαίνονται to be too general. Rowe, for example, has ‘people patently avoid pain . . .’; Irwin: ‘Evidently, however, we avoid pain as an evil . . .’; Crisp: ‘But people manifestly avoid the one as an evil . . .’. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 326, sees the point well: ‘Those who preach this will not be able to live by it, and this discrepancy between actions and words will discredit even the part-truth of what they say, since it takes discernment to see that part-truth and most people are not discerning (1172a27–b1).’
even for Speusippus himself. The way is paved, then, for Aristotle to outline in the remainder of the book his own preferred view of the proper relationship between pleasure and a good human life.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

BIBLIOGRAPHY


